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Abstract. As computing and computer networks become more and more inter-
twined with our daily lives, the need to develop flexible and on-the-fly methods
for authenticating people and their devices to each other has become increasingly
pressing. Traditional methods for providing authentication have relied on very
weak assumptions about communication channels, and very strong assumptions
about secrecy and the availability of trusted authorities. The resulting protocols
rely on infrastructures such as shared secrets and public key hierarchies that are
too rigid to support the type of flexible ad-hoc communication we are growing
accustomed to and beginning to rely upon.
Recently, different families of protocols allow us to weaken assumptions about
trusted infrastructure by strengthening the assumptions about communication chan-
nels. Examples include proximity verification protocols, that rely, for example, on
the round trip time of a challenge and response; and bootstrapping protocols that
rely upon human-verifiable channels, that is, low-bandwidth communication be-
tween humans. The problem now becomes: How do we ensure that the protocols
are achieve their security goals? A vast amount of literature exists on the formal
analysis of cryptographic protocols, and mathematical foundations of protocol
correctness, but almost all of it relies upon the standard assumptions about the
channels in end-to-end, and so its usefulness for nonstandard channels in per-
vasive networks is limited. In this paper, we present some initial results of an
effort towards a formalizing the reasoning about the security of protocols over
nonstandard channels.
1 Introduction
Pervasive computing has become a reality. We have long been used to the idea that
computers are everywhere, and that we interact with multiple devices that can interact
with each other and with the Internet. But there is another important aspect of pervasive
computing. Not only has the concept of a computer and a computer network changed,
but the notion of a communication channel is changing as well. Wireless channels, of
course, have been a common part of computer networks for some time. Quantum chan-
nels are appearing on the horizon. But what is really interesting is the way the nature
! Supported by ONR. Current address: University of London, Royal Holloway, Department of
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of the information sent along these channels is changing. Information is no longer re-
stricted to input typed in by users, but includes environmental information gathered by
the network itself, including location, biometric information, and weather and motion
data picked up by sensors.
These new concepts of channels have also resulted in new methods for authentica-
tion. The old mantra of “who you are, what you know, and what you have,” has been
extended to include concepts such as “where you are” (verification of location and/or
proximity), ”what you are” (use of techniques such as CAPTCHAs to verify that the en-
tity on the other end is a human being [2]) and “what you see” (use of human-verifiable
channels to boot strap secure communication, as in [20, 29]).
An important thing to note is that these new methods of authentication do not ex-
ist on their own. They are typically integrated with more traditional authentication and
key exchange protocols that use more conventional channels. This is partly because
the new channels may have particular properties that make them less practical to use
than conventional channels except when absolutely necessary. Human-verifiable chan-
nels are limited in bandwidth. Channels used to implement proximity verification and
CAPTCHAs rely on strict timing properties. And even when the new channels do not
have these limitations, it will be necessary to integrate them with standard channels so
they can be used to interface with traditional systems.
When integrating specialized channels with traditional channels for authentication,
one is usually faced with a number of choices. One needs to choose when to use the
specialized channel, what information to send on the specialized channel, and what
information to send on the conventional channel. Different choices can have different
effects on the security, applicability, and efficiency of an authentication protocol.
In this paper we introduce a system for reasoning about authentication using multi-
ple types of channels with different types of properties. The system consists consists of
two parts. The first is a graphical language for displaying cryptographic protocols that
use different types of channels. This is based closely on the usual graphical methods
for representing secure protocols. The second is a logic for reasoning about the secu-
rity of authentication protocols that use different types of channels. This logic is an
extension of the Protocol Derivation logic described in [6, 22]. Both language and logic
are intended to be used to reason about, not only individual protocols, but families of
protocols, in order to help us identify and reason about tradeoffs.
Outline of the paper. In Section 2 we discuss the problem of modeling pervasive se-
curity protocols. In Section 3 we describe the introduction of channel axioms into the
Protocol Derivation Logic. In Section 4 we introduce the problem of distance and prox-
imity bounding, provide axioms for channels, and discuss how it they can be reasoned
about in PDL. In Section 5 we provide a similar discussion of human-verifiable authen-
tication via social channels. In Section 6 we conclude the paper and discuss plans for
future work.
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2 Modeling pervasive security protocols
A protocol is a distributed computational process, given with a set of desired runs, or
the properties that the desired runs should satisfy. To prove security of a protocol we
usually demonstrate that only the desired runs are possible, or that the undesired runs
can be detected through participants’ local observations.
Security protocols are thus naturally modeled formally within a process calculus,
as in [22]. In order to model security protocols in pervasive networks, we extend the
process model from [22], used for analyzing security protocols in cyber networks. The
main complication is that in this previous work, as in most work in the analysis of
security protocols, the network itself was kept implicit in the process model, because
every two nodes can be assumed to be linked, without loss of generality. The network
infrastructure provides for that. More precisely, the network infrastructure provides the
service of routing and relaying the messages, and hides the actual routes and relays
(unless they change the messages, in which case they are considered to be attackers).
From user’s point of view, it looks like the messages are delivered directly from the
sender to the receiver, and the network infrastructure is abstracted away.
In a pervasive network, the assumption that there is a link between every two nodes
is not justified: some devices have a range, some have access to one type of channels,
some to other type of channels, and they may not have any direct, or even indirect links
to connect them. To express this, we must make the network explicit.
Moreover, the toolkit of security primitives and security tokens, available to estab-
lish secure communication, is essentially richer in pervasive networks.
2.1 Principals and security tokens
Principals are the computational agents that control one or more network nodes, where
they can send and receive messages. A principal can only observe (and use in his rea-
soning) the events that happen at his own network nodes. 1
Security tokens are the data used by the principals to realize secure communication.
Informally, security tokens are usually divided in three groups:
– something you know: digital keys, passwords, and other secrets 2
– something you have: physical keys and locks, smart cards, tamper-resistant devices,
or
– something you are: biometric properties, e.g. fingerprints, or written signatures,
assumed to be unforgeable
The difference between these three types of security tokens lies in the extent to which
they can be shared with others:
– what you know can be copied and sent to others,
1 We shall model his observations of the actions of others as messages of special kind, i.e. re-
ceived over the social channels.
2 i.e., data distributed to some principals and not to the others; data known to all are not very
useful as security tokens
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– what you have cannot be copied in general, but can be given away, whereas
– who you are cannot be copied, or given away.
Standard end-to-end security is in principle realized entirely by means of cryptographic
software, and the principals only use the various kinds of secrets. This means that a
principal can be identified with the list of secrets that she knows. If Alice and Bob share
all their secrets, then there is no way to distinguish them by the challenges that can be
issued on a standard network3. For all purposes, they must be considered as the same
principal.
In pervasive networks, on the other hand, security is also supported by cryptographic
hardware: besides the secrets, a principal is also supplied with some security devices.
They are represented as some of the network nodes, given to the principals to control.
A dishonest principal (or an honest certificate authority) can relinquish control of a
security device, and give it to another principal.
To capture the third and the strongest kind of security tokens, and distinguish the
principals by who they are, we need some biometric devices. They are represented as
network nodes. Principals’ biometric properties, on the other hand, are represented as
some of the network nodes as well, available to respond to the challenges from the
biometric devices. The only difference of a biometric property p from the other network
nodes given to a principal A to control is that p always remains under A’s control,
and cannot be given away to another principal. We call the networks equipped with
biometric devices and biometric properties — biometric networks.
2.2 Modeling networks
In modeling security, principals can be identified with their security tokens, since se-
curity tokens are the material that security is built from. Summarizing the preceding
section, we can say that
– in end-to-end networks (or cyber-networks), the only security tokens are the secrets,
and the principals are reduced to what they know;
– in pervasive networks, the security tokens also include some security devices, and
the principals are identified not just by what they know, but also by what they have;
– in biometric networks, the security tokens furthermore include some biometric
properties, and the corresponding biometric devices, needed to test them; the prin-
cipals are identified not just by what they know, or what they have, but now we take
into account who they are.
Communication networks. A communication network consists of
network graph N , consisting of a set of nodes N, a set of links L, and a source-
target assignment 〈b,l〉 : L N×N, inducing the matrix representation N =
(Nmn)N×N with the entries Nmn = 〈b,l〉−1(m,n) for m,n ∈ N,
3 We assume that they share the secrets dynamically: if a new one is sent to one, it will immedi-
ately be shared with the other. This implies that they also observe the events on the same set of
network nodes.
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channel types C , and the type assignment e : L C ,
set of principals (or agents) A , partially ordered by the subprincipal relation!, 4.
control c© : A §N, such that (1), and often also (2) is satisfied:
A! B =⇒ c©A⊆ c©B (1)
A )! B∧A )" B =⇒ c©A∩ c©B= /0 (2)
Remark. In a cyber network, the end-to-end assumption, that all security is done at the
”ends” and any route ”in-between” is as good as any other route implies that the network
service can be reduced to an assumption that there is a single link between every two
nodes, i.e. Nmn = 1 for all m and n. Moreover, C = 1, i.e. all channels are of the same
type, insecure. So the only nontrivial part of the structure is c© : A §N. But
controlling one network node or controlling another one makes no difference, because
a message can always be sent from everywhere to everywhere. So the only part of the
above definition visible in the process model needed for cyber security is the poset A .
Cyber networks: principals are what they know. The fact that the principals can
be identified with the lists of secrets that they know is represented by an inclusion
K : A T ∗, which we call environment. However, since a principal may learn new
secrets when a process is run (or during a protocol execution), her environment may
grow: at each state m, she may have a different environment KmA such that for ev-
ery transition m1 m2 holds Km1A ⊆ Km2A. During a protocol execution, different
principals may thus become indistinguishable if they learn each other’s secrets, since
KA = KB⇒ A = B. This means that the set of principals A may also vary from state
to state in the execution: there is a family Am, with the surjections Am1 Am2 for
every transition m1 m2 , induced by identifying the principals that become indis-
tinguishable.
In the cyber network model, a principal may have a number of internal actions
involving creating nonces, incrementing counters, etc. But the principal has only three
types of external actions: send, receive, and match. In the last, the principal matches
received data with what he or she is expecting. In some models, receive and match are
identified.
Pervasive networks: principals are what they have. A pervasive network is obtained
by distinguishing, within a cyber network as defined above, a set of mobile nodes (i.e.
security devices) N˜, from the fixed nodes N, so that N = N˜+N.
Besides the send, receive, and match actions, the process calculus now has two new
kinds of actions, which allow each principal to:
– move a mobile node under his control, and reconnect it elsewhere in the network;
– pass control of a mobile node to another principal.
This means that the network connections and controls of the mobile nodes can dynam-
ically change during a process run.
4 Briefly, A is a subprincipal of B is A “speaks for” B in the sense of [1, 14] or “acts for” B in the
sense of [19]
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Biometric networks: principals are what they are. A biometric network is obtained
by distinguishing, among the nodes of a pervasive network as defined above, two more
sets
– Br ⊆ N˜ of biometric properties, and
– Bc ⊆ N of biometric verifiers.
The intended interpretation of these two sets of nodes is implemented by ther require-
ment that:
– control of the elements of Br cannot be passed to another principal,
– the elements of Bc are related with the elements of Br, so that the former can issue
biometric challenges to the latter.
2.3 Message delivery modes
The main source of the new security phenomena in pervasive network is the fact that
different types of channels have different message delivery modes.
In cyber networks, a message is usually in the form A to B : m, where A is the
claimed sender, B the purported receiver, and m the message payload. As explained
before, the network service is implicit in this model, so that A and B refer both to the
principals and to the network nodes that they control. All three message fields can be
read, intercepted, and substituted by the attacker. The point of the end-to-end security is
that the receiver can still extract some assurances, even from a spoofable message, be-
cause the various cryptographic forms of m limit attacker’s capabilities. Moreover, this
message form is an abstract presentation of the fact that the message delivery service
provided by the network and the transportation layers, say of the Internet.
In pervasive networks, different channel types provide different message delivery
services. In general, there is no universal name or address space, listing all nodes. An-
notating all messages by sender’s and receiver’s identities thus makes no sense, and the
principal’s identities are added to the payload when that information is needed.
There may be no link between two nodes, and no way to send a message from one
to the other. On the other hand, a message can be delivered directly, e.g. when a smart
card is inserted into a reader, without either of the principals controlling the card and
the reader knowing each other.
The different message delivery modes determine the different security guarantees
of the various channel types.
3 Templates and Logics
3.1 Templates
In this section we give an introduction to the use of templates and logics.
A template is a graphical specification of the desired behavior of a protocol that can
be filled in with a number of actual protocol specifications. A template begins by de-
scribing the different types of channels available between principals. This is done sim-
ply by drawing a line indicating a channel between two principals that share the channel.
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Different types of lines indicate different types of channels. Messages passed between
principals along a channel are indicated by arrows between principals corresponding to
the channel type. Internal transitions are indicated by arrows from a principal to itself.
For example, the following template gives a common situation in which Alice gen-
erates a nonce ( ix), and sends a cryptographic challenge cABx containing x to Bob, after
which Bob sends a response rABx to Alice. Note at this point we give no details about







Fig. 1: Challenge-Response Template
What we would like to say, of course, is if that Alice creates x and sends cABx to Bob,
and subsequently receives rABx, she knows that Bob sent rABx after receiving cABx. The
Protocol Derivation Logic we describe below will give us a way of stating and proving
this requirement.
3.2 Protocol Derivation Logic (PDL)
PDL Syntax. PDL is a descendant of an early version of the Compositional Proto-
col Logic (CPL) [9] and has certain of its axioms in common with it. Like CPL, it is
intended to be used to prove security of protocols without explicitly specifying the be-
havior of the attacker. Unlike CPL, it is a logic about authentication only, although it
can be interfaced with a companion secrecy logic [22] when it is necessary to reason
about secrecy. In PDL principals are partially ordered sets where A⊂ B (A is a subprin-
cipal of B) if A “speaks for” B in the sense of [1, 14] or “acts for” B in the sense of
[19]. The logic makes use of cryptographic functions that only certain principals can
compute; thus keys do not need to appear explicitly unless we are reasoning about key
distribution.
In PDL principals exchangemessages constructed using a term algebra consisting of
constants, variables, and function symbols. The term algebra may obey an equational
theory E, or it may be a free algebra. The constants and variables used in the term
algebra may or may not obey a type system which is specified by the protocol writer.
We consider a protocol as a partially ordered set of actions, as in Lamport [13],
in which a < b means that action a occurs before action b. We let (t)A denote t being
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received by A, 〈t〉A denote a message being received by A. We let 〈t〉A< where t =
f (x1, · · · ,xn) denote A creating t by applying the function f to the arguments x 1, · · · ,xn
and then sending it ; thus this is the first time A sends t. We let x≺ y denote the statement
“if an action of the form y occurs, then an action of the form x must have occurred
previously.” We let i. n denote the generation of a fresh, unpredictable nonce, n, and
(µ. n)A denote the generation of some arbitrary term n that A has never generated before.
We think of i and µ as acting a binders and write them as such. Finally, we let A : S
denote A knows S, and HA to denote that fact that A is an honest principal following the
rules of the protocol.
We let 〈〈s〉〉A denote A sending a message that was computed using s. We let ((s))A
denote A receiving a message that was computed using s. Finally, we let 〈〈s〉〉A〈 denote
A’s computing s for the first time (that is, the first time forA) and sending it in a message.
We use certain syntatic subterm conventions to determine if a term was used to
compute a message. Suppose that 〈m〉A or (m)Ais an event. We use the convention that
if s occurs as a subterm of m then s could have been used to compute m. We conclude
that s must have been used to compute m is for all legal substitutions m to the variables
in m, and for all y=E mm, s appears as a subterm of y. 5
We define a legal substitution as follows:
Definition 3.1. Let P be a protocol specification, together with a type system T. Let R
be an description of a run in P where R is a set of PDL events partially ordered by the
< relation. We say that a substitution m to the free variables in R is legal if
1. If a type system has been specified, then for any variable v in R, mR is well-typed,
and the type of mv is a subtype of the type of v, and;
2. The run mR does not disobey any PDL axioms when s a subterm of event (x)V or
〈x〉V occurring in R is interpreted as ((s))V or 〈〈s〉〉V , respectively.
To give an example, consider the run
(ix)B.(z)A < 〈x〉B<
The substitution mz = x is not legal, since it would violate the PDL axiom (which we
will present later) that says that a fresh variable can’t be sent or received until if is sent
for the first time by its creator.
In the case in which the term algebra is a free algebra, we conclude that, for any
message m sent or received, s is a subterm of m means that s must have been used to
compute m. For other term algebras obeying some equational theory, this may not be
the case. Consider the following:
〈x〉A < (x⊕y)A
where⊕ stands for exclusive-or with the usual cancellation properties x⊕x= 0,x⊕0=
x. It is easy to see that if my= x⊕ z we get
5 Note that the convention used here is a little different from that used in [16] in which the
interpretation in terms of legal substitutions was only used for received messages.
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〈x〉A < (z)A
so that x was not necessarily used to compute the message that A received.
In [16], we develop a syntactical means of checking, for the basic PDL axioms,
whether or not a message was createdwas created using a term x, where the term algebra
in question is the free algebra augmented by exclusive-or.
PDL Axioms. PDL axioms are of three types. The first type describe basic properties
of the communicationmedium. These are standard axioms that do not change; the main
innovation of the work we describe in this paper is that we will be introducing new
channel axioms for different types of channels. The second type describes the properties
of the cryptosystems used by the protocols; these need to be augmentedwhenever a new
type of cryptosystem is used. The third type describes the actions of honest principals
in a protocol run. These, of course, are different for each protocol.
The basic channel axioms are as follows:
The receive axiom says that everything that is received must have been originated
by someone:
A : ((m))A⇒ ∃X . 〈〈m〉〉X< < ((m))A (rcv)
The new axiom describes the behavior of the i operator.
(in)B∧ (aA = ((n))A∨〈〈n〉〉A)⇒ (in)B < aA (new)
∧ (A )= B⇒ (in)B < 〈〈n〉〉B < ((n))A ≤ aA))
where FV (a) denotes the free variables of a. Thus, any event a involving a fresh term
must occur after the term is generated, and if the principal A engaging in the event is
not the originator of the term B , then a send event by B involving n and a receive event
by A involving n must have occurred between the create and a events.
An example of an axiom describing the properties of a cryptographic function, is
the following, describing the behavior of pubic key signature.
〈〈SA(t)〉〉X< =⇒ X = A (sig)
This simply says that, if a principal X signs a term t with A’s digital signature and sends
it in a message, then X must be A.
An example of a protocol specification is A’s role in the challenge-response proto-
col:
HA=⇒ (ix)A.〈〈cABx〉〉A
In other words, if A is honest she creates a fresh value x and sends it in a challenge.
We are now able to express the Challenge-Response requirements template that we
expressed in graphical form in Section 3.1 in PDL as follows:
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A : (ix)A. 〈〈cABx〉〉A < ((rABx))A
=⇒ 〈〈cABx〉〉A < ((cABx))B < 〈〈rABx〉〉B< < ((rABx))A (cr)
We consider it a proof obligation that will be discharged in PDL.
Suppose that we instantiate cAB with the identity and rAB with SIGB. Then we can
prove the challenge-response axiom in the following way.
1. We start out with what A observes: A : (ix)A. 〈x〉A< < (SB(x))A
2. Applying the rcv axiom, we obtain A : ∃Q. 〈〈SB(x)〉〉Q < (SB(x))A
3. Applying the new axiom,we obtainA : ((ix))A. ∃Q. 〈x〉A< < ((x))Q< 〈〈SB(x)〉〉Q〈 <
(SB(x))A.
4. Applying the sig axiom, we obtain q= B, and we are done.
For the purposes of analyzing protocols that use different types of channels, we will
need a means of specifying which channels we are using. Thus we extend PDL with a
channel notation. We denote send actions taken along a channel g as 〈a : g〉 and receive
actions taken along g as (a : g). When no channel is specified we assume that standard
cyber channel that obeys only the rcv and new axioms is being used.
4 Timed channel protocols
4.1 Proximity authentication
Our assumptions about cyber channels are very basic: 1) if a message is received it
must have been sent by somebody, and 2) a few simple assumptions about the ordering
of actions involving nonces. However, there are many cases where that is not enough.
We consider for example the authentication problem in Section 3.1 as it might arise in
a pervasive setting. In a pervasive network, Alice is, say, a gate keeper that controls a
smart card reader m, which is a network node. Bob arrives at the gate with his smart
card n, and creates a network link between m and n. Alice may not know Bob, but she
is ready to authenticate any principal X who arrives at the gate, and links his smart
card x to the reader m. She will allow access to anyone whose credentials are on her
authorization list. Authentication with a fresh nonce bound to the secret credentials
is necessary to prevent replay. This Gate Keeper Challenge-Response template extends
Fig. 1 by one prior step, where Bob identifies himself to Alice by sending his name. The
point of discussing this very simple scenario is to emphasize the role of the network link
in the authentication. The goal of the authentication is to assure that
– (a) Bob is authorized to enter, and
– (p) he is at the gate.
While the authorization requirement (a) is emphasized, the proximity requirement (p)
must not be ignored. If it is not satisfied, then an intruder Ivan may impersonate Bob.
Ivan needs to control a smart card reader m ′ at another gate, where real Bob wants to
enter; and he needs to establish a radio link between the card readerm ′ and a smart card
n′, with which he himself arrives at Alice’s gate.
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◦ ◦rABx ◦rABx ◦rABx
Fig. 2: Attack on Gate Keeper Protocol
In a cyber network (assuming that the radio link between m ′ and n′ is realized as
an ordinary network link), this would be a correct protocol run: Ivan is only relaying
the messages. Indeed, Bob’s and Alice’s records of the conversation coincide, and the
matching conversation definition of authenticity is satisfied.
In a pervasive network gate keeper model, the above protocol run is considered as
a Man-in-the-Middle attack: although unchanged, the messages are relayed through the
nodes under control of a non-participant Ivan. This would allow Ivan to impersonate
Bob and enter Alice’s facility unauthorized. These attacks, by the way, are not hypo-
thetical; for example they have been demonstrated by Tippenhauer et al. in [27], in
which location spoofing attacks on iPods and iPhones are implemented.
This example shows why pervasive networks require stronger authentication re-
quirements than those routinely used in cyber security. The strengthening requires ver-
ifying not just that the principal Bob has sent the response, but also that he has sent it
directly from a neighboring network node. This is the proximity requirement. It arises
from taking the network into account, as an explicit security concern.
One way to verify whether a proximity requirement is satisfied is to use timed chan-
nels in distance bounding protocols. That is, if we can measure the time between the
sending of a challenge and the receipt of the response, and we know the speed at which
the signal travels, we can use this information to estimate the distance between two
devices. The trick is to do this in a secure way.
4.2 Proximity verification by timing
Timed channels. We model a timed channel simply as a channel that allows the sender
to time the message it sends and receives. More precisely, the difference between the
timed channel and the standard channel is that
– the send and receive times can be measured only on the timed channel,
– the purported sender and receiver are a part of every message only on the standard
channel.
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Timed challenge-response. The main assumption about the timed channels is that the
messages travel at a constant speed c, and that the length of network links is approxi-
mately d, say at most d+¡. By measuring the time t that it takes to a message x to arrive
from a node m to a node n, one can verify whether x has travelled through a direct link
by making sure that ct ≤ d+¡. If Victor is the owner of the nodem and Peggy owns the
node n, then Peggy can prove to Victor that she is in the neighborhood by very quickly
responding to x, say by f x. If Victor sends x at time o0 and receives f x at time o1, then
he needs to verify that c(o1− o0) ≤ 2(d+ ¡)+ e, where e is the time that Peggy may
need to generate and send f x.










Fig. 3: Timed Challenge-Response Template
where the principals are now V (Victor the Verifier) and P (Peggy the Prover).
An action along a timed channel is called timed if the principal performing it notes
the time (on its local clock) at which it was performed, untimed if the principal does
not. A timed action a performed by a principal N is denoted by o ia, where a is an
action and oi denotes the time at which N performed the action. The taking of the time
measurement in the diagram is noted by a bullet • under the name of the principal
performing the action. Intuitively, this template says that after sending a fresh value x
at time o0 and receiving f x at time o1, Victor knows that there is someone within the
range of at most c2 (o1− o0). This template can be interpreted as a specification of the
security property of the function f .
We make a comment here about implementation of timed challenge and response.
For example, consider the case where f is the identity. Peggy can start responding to
Victor as soon as she receives the first bit of x. Depending on the degree of accuracy
needed, this can give Peggy a considerable advantage. Thus, unless Peggy is a trusted
principal who will wait until she receives the entire nonce, it is advisable to use a bit-by-
bit challenge and response, where the chance of Peggy guessing the correct bit response
is bounded above by a constant. We can then choose x large enough so that the chance
of Peggy cheating without being detected is negligible. A more thorough discussion of
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bit-by-bit challenge and response and the security issues involved in implementing it
are found in [7]. In this paper we abstract away from these issues and make the notation
< stand for both the conventional and bit-by-bit notions of precedes.
Specifying timed channels in PDL. PDL has already been used to analyze distance
bounding protocols in [16], for which we defined a timestamp function and some ax-
ioms governing it. However, this had the disadvantage that we could not specify in
a natural way the actions for which timestamps were or were not defined. Moreover,
specifying axioms in terms of which channels they apply to allows us to structure our
specifications in a more modular way, in keeping with the spirit in which PDL was de-
veloped. In this section we describe how to do this, using a timestamp function similar
in construction to the one used in [16]. However, in this case the function is used to
describe properties of the channel.
An event a taking place along a timed channel is denoted by o ia, where oi is a real
number denoting the time at which the event takes place. Since recording of time can
only take place on timed channels, and axioms involving timed channels involve time-
recorded events only, we do not need any timed channel identifier. We have one axiom,
saying that local times increase:
o0aA < o1bA =⇒ o0 < o1 (inc)
We also use the following definition of distance:
Definition 4.1. Let A and B be two principals. We define the distance between A and B,
or d(A,B) to the minimum o of all possible (o0− o2)/2 such that the following occurs:
(in)A. (im)B. o0〈〈n〉〉A< < ((n))B < 〈〈m〉〉B< < o1 ((m)) A
The inc axiom guarantees that this is well-defined.
Security goals of proximity authentication. The task is now to design and analyze
protocols that validate the proximity challenge-response template, which is the timed
challenge-response template augmented with a conclusion about time and distance. It
is expressed in PDL as follows:
V : (ix)V . 0〈x〉V < b( fVPx)V
=⇒ 0〈x〉V < (x)P < 〈 fVPx〉〉P< < ( fVPx))P < b( fVPx)V ∧ d(V,P)≤ b (crp)
The (crp) template says that, if V creates a nonce, and sends it along the timed
channel at time 0, and then receives a response at time b, then P must have received the
challenge after V sent it and then sent the response before V received it. Moreover, the
distance betweenV and P is less than or equal to b.
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4.3 Distance bounding protocols
The simplest way to achieve our goal is to combine the cryptographic challenge-response
from Fig. 1 with the timed challenge-response from Fig. 3. The authentication reason-
ing will then follow from the templates (cr) and (crp), taking cVPx = x in the former,
sending both challenges together. The only part of the cryptographic challenge sent on
the standard channel that is not sent on the timed channel are the purported sender and
receiver. So they need to exchange some messages on the standard channel, to tell each
other who they are.
Cryptographic response to a challenge usually takes time to compute. This means
that it either (1) needs to be sent separately from the timed response, or (2) that it must
be very quickly computable, as a function of the challenge. These two possible design
choices subdivide distance bounding protocol in two families: those with two responses,
and those with one response.
The easiest approach, from a design point of view, is to use two responses, since this
allows one to avoid the challenging task of developing a function that both provides the
necessary security and is fast to compute. However, in order to accomplish this the two
responses must be linked together securely.
The approach of using two responses is that followed by the original distance bound-
ing protocol of Brands and Chaum [3]. There, the response sent on the timed channel is
the exclusive-or of the prover’s nonce with the verifier’s, sent as a sequence of one-bit
challenge-response pairs. The response sent on the conventional channel is the digital
signature on the two nonces. The binding message is a commitment (e.g. a one-way
hash function) that the prover computes over its nonce, and sends to the verifier be-
fore the responder . In Cˇapkun-Hubaux [5] the binding function is the same, the timed
challenge and response is a single exchange of nonces, and the response sent on the con-
ventional channel is a hash taken over the nonces. In Meadows et al. [16] the response
sent over the timed channel is a one-way hash function taken over the prover’s name
and nonce, exclusive-ored with the verifier’s nonces. This combination of commitment
with timed response reduces the message complexity of the protocol.
Hancke and Kuhn [16], who developed their protocol independently of Brands and
Chaum, take the approach of using just one response. They do that by using a function
# which is quick to compute, but for which it not possible for a principal who has seen
x# y for only one value of x to compute y. This is obviously impractical to use if y is a
secret key shared between verifier and prover, so instead prover and verifier use a keyed
hash computed over a fresh values and a counter exchanged earlier in the protocol.
A detailed formal analysis of Hancke and Kuhn’s distance bounding protocol has
been presented in [24]. A sketch of a PDL analysis of the Brands-Chaum protocol is
given in [23] 6
5 Social channel protocols
Social channels arise from the fact that many pervasive devices, such as cellular phones,
PDAs, and laptop computers, use their humans not only to promulgate in space, but
6 The details of these analyses were written after the workshop version of the present paper was
completed.
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also to exchange information. For instance, a great part of the initial address books
on many devices is usually received through this channel: a human manually enters
some addresses of other devices. The devices often use their humans to exchange short
messages.
5.1 A timed social protocol that we all use
Often, an address received through a human channel is authenticated using a timed
channel: one device sends a message to the other one through a network channel, as-
sumed to have some minimal speed, and then it observes through the human channel
whether the message is received by the other device within a reasonable amount of time.
This protocol can be interpreted as binding a challenge sent on a timed channel with
a response on a human channel. This binding is assured by the human observing the







where the notation b o 5 means that the 5-side sees the other side perform the
action b at time o. In this case A sees B perform b=(m), i.e. he receivesm. This message
may be just A’s own identifier. Although m thus may not be fresh, if the waiting time
o1− o0 is sufficiently small, the chance that the message that B receives is not the same
message that A has sent is assumed to be negligible.
5.2 Formalizing social channels
The non-local observations through social channels have deep repercussions on the
problems of authentication. As pointed out in the beginning, the source of the prob-
lem of authentication in computer networks arises from the fact that all observations
are local: a computer Alice can only observe her own actions (among which are the ac-
tions of sending and receiving messages). However, a mobile phone Alice can ascertain
that another mobile phone Bob has received her message, if their humans are standing
next to each other, observing both devices. The other way around, the mobile phone
Bob can ascertain that Alice has sent that message, because Bob’s human has seen the
message on Alice’s screen, and Alice’s human pushing the send button. Moreover, be-
sides observing each other’s actions, Alice and Bob can also send and receive brief
messages through their humans, which are considered authentic because the humans
observe each other.
Formally, we consider social actions in the form
!B to A : "
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which intuitively mean that Bob displays a term or an action  for Alice to see. We
attempt to capture this intended meaning by the following axioms
!B to A : `" =⇒ A : `B (sc1)
!B to A : `" " !C to A : a" =⇒ A : `B " aC (sc2)
!B to A : `(t)"∨!B to A : t" =⇒ mt ∈ KA (sc3)
∀T ∈O∀t ∈ T∃u ∈ T. u )= t ∧ mu= mt (sc4)
which should be read as follows:
– (sc1) If A observes the action `B, then she knows that `B really occurred.
– (sc2) If A observes the action `B before aC, then she knows that `B occurred before
aC.
– (sc3) If A observes an action with a term t, or is shown the term t itself, then A
knows the digest mt.
– (sc4) For every sufficiently large set of terms T , and every t ∈ T it is feasible to find
a different term u ∈ T with the same digests mt = mu.
Intuitively, the prefix m can be construed as a short hash function, leading to many colli-
sions. Still more concretely, in the above scenario with mobile devices, this corresponds
to the fact that Alice’s human sees Bob’s human receive a message, but if the message
is long, he can only see a part that fits on Bob’s screen; if the message is numeric, he
can only discern a couple of digits. Therefore, many messages look the same, and the
message that Bob has received may not be the one that Alice had sent after all.
The task is to design protocols to bootstrap authentication using these low band-
width fully authentic social channels.
Graphic notation. In protocol diagrams, we use the following graphic elements:
– `B 5A represent!B to A : `"
– `B mt 5A represents !B to A : `(t)"
– ◦B mt 5A represents !B to A : t"
The annotations by m can be omitted, since they are redundant. Yet it is may be useful,
at least in the initial derivations, to keep a reminder that all social communication is low
bandwidth, and shold be viewed as digested through a short hash function m.
5.3 Socially authenticated key establishment
We begin from one of the simplest protocol tasks: Bob announces his public key e (or
an arbitrary message) on the standard channel, and his human displays a digest on the
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Both cases are open to a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack. The problem is that, by ax-
iom (sc4), the Intruder can easily find a public/private key pair (e˘, d˘) such that m(e˘,B) =
m(e,B). As always, the Intruder is also assumed to be in control of the standard chan-
nel. So in the first case, he can find (e˘, d˘) such that m(e˘,B) = m(e,B), and replace Bob’s
announcement of e,B by e˘,B. In the second case, the Intruder needs to intercept and
hold Bob’s announcement of e,B, compute m(e,B), find (e˘, d˘) as above, announce e˘,B
in Bob’s name, and wait for Bob’s human to announce the digest m(e,B) = m(e˘,B). In
both cases, the Intruder ends up with the key d˘ to read the messages sent to Bob, and
Bob cannot read them.
Social commitment. The MitM attack on the social channel authentication can be
prevented in the same way as in the case of timed channel authentication: by binding
the communications on the two channel types. For this purpose, Bob generates a fresh
nonce, to be included in the social digest. The value of this nonce is publicly announced
only after of the key, so that the Intruder, at the time when the key is announced, cannot
know what the value of the digest will be, and cannot look for the collisions. On the
other hand, in order to bind this nonce to the key (and to the protocol session, in order
to prevent confusion), the nonce needs to be committed from the beginning, and, of















Authentication before decommitment. A particularly simple instance of the template
on the left has been discussed by Hoepman [11]. The nonce y is also used as the private
key, corresponding to the public key e = gy. He takes the simple commitment schema
where ctx = Hx is just a sufficiently strong hash function, whereas the decommitment
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Of course, the main point of the Diffie-Helman exchange it to get a shared key g xy by
composing the above protocol with its mirror image, where Alice generates x and an-
nounces gx. Hoepman also considers a final key validation phase. There are interesting
possibilities to employ social channel here as well.
Authentication after decommitment. The problem with the template on the right
hand side in (3) the is that the Intruder can simply hold the commitment message until
the decommitment is sent, and then proceed with the MitM attack as before. To prevent
this, we need to introduce a message from Alice at the dotted lines, confirming that the
commitment is received. Note that this message needs to be authenticated as well: if
the Intruder can fake it, he can get the decommitment from Bob, and again launch his
MitM attack. But the only way to authenticate Alice’s message, in absence of all other
infrastructure, is the social channel again. So Alice needs to generate and send a fresh
value as her acknowledgement, and this value also needs to be included in the social









5 ◦m f (e,x,y)
(4)
Remark. Authentication on the social channel does not follow the challenge-response
template of authentication. There is no reason why it should: the challenge-response
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template implements indirect authentication, based on demonstrating a capability (to
invert cryptographic functions, or to quickly respond on a timed channel), whereas the
social channel implements a direct authentication, based on observing other principals’
actions.
Mutual authentication. The analogous use of the nonces x and y in (4) is quite con-
venient when both Alice and Bob want to announce their keys. Alice’s nonce x, used
in (4) just to acknowledge receipt of Bob’s commitment can now also be used to bind
Alice’s announcement to its social digest, whereas Bob’s nonce y, which was used for
this purpose in (4) can now also be used to acknowledge receipt of Alice’s commitment.
Composing (4) with its mirror-image version, where Alice and Bob exchange the roles,














5 5m f (eA,eB,x,y)
(5)
The coupled messages from Alice to Bob and vice versa, as well the mutual social
authentication at the end, are new graphic elements, corresponding to concurrent, or
parallel actions of both principals. Note, however, that both concurrently sent messages
in the second line must be received before either of the messages in the third line is sent.
The social exchange in the end can be viewed in a similar way, as a pair of messages
sent and received concurrently, this time on the social channel; but it may be more
natural to view social authentication as a joint action of both principals.
Instances of (4) and (5). Vaudenay’s SAS-authentication [28] (where SAS stands for
”Short Authenticated Strings”) is an instance of (4), with f (e,x,y) = x⊕ y. The special
case of Nguyen-Roscoe’s Symmetrized HCBK protocol, reduced to two principals is an
instance of (5), with f (e,x,y) = e::(x⊕y), with the simple commitment schema7 imple-
mented by a short digest function ct(y) =H(y), and dt(y) = y. Security of this protocol
essentially depends on the special properties of this function, discussed in detail in [21].
7 They include Bob’s identity explicitly in the commitment. We keep principal’s identity implicit
in every commitment.
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HCBK protocol: matching conversations socially. The paradigm of ”matching conver-
sations” is, in a sense, the ultimate goal of authentication: if Alice’s and Bob’s views of
all their conversation coincide, then they surely see their actions correctly, since Alice
sees her own actions correctly, and Bob his. In order to match their views, each of them
must derive the actions of the other from their own.
Nguyen and Roscoe’s HCBK protocol [21] directly attacks the problem of simulat-
neous mutual authentication of whole groups of principals. The strategy is to use social
channels for direct simultaneous matching of the conversations: all principals announce
on their social channels the digests of their views (records) of the conversation con-
versations, and their humans check that the digests match. This is a remarkably direct
approach to authentication.
The point is that template (5) readily lifts from 2 to n principals: instead of just Alice
and Bob sending their commitments in parallel, and then waiting for each other, all n
principals can do that in parallel. The process expressions above remain quite similar
to the two party case above. The technical proviso for this extension is that a suitable
format for n-way matching on the social channel needs to be agreed upon. In particular,
the principals must agree about
– (1) a method for each of them to arrive to the same ordering of the announcements
that each of them has recorded, and needs to hash,
– (2) a social protocol to compare the values of all digests.
Both problems require ”breaking the symmetry” in a coordinated way. The first one
can be deferred to the social channel, by adding an initial social message, announcing
a linear ordering of all principals’ names. The second problem, minimizing the number
of comparisons between the digests, requires imposing a tree structure on the group.
Both problems have been major concerns in the Bluetooth design [12].
6 Conclusion
We have described some of the different types of channels that arise in pervasive net-
works, and the challenges and opportunities they give for authentication. We also give
a formal description of several types of channels that arise in pervasive computing, and
demonstrate a graphical template language for describing the behavior of protocols that
make use of these different channels. We also describe some of the axioms that describe
the behavior of some of these channels.
We are currently extending our work to develop logic for reasoning about the se-
curity of authentication protocols that make use of these different channels. We have
found earlier that this approach, combined with the use of graphical templates that can
describe both abstract and concrete specifications of protocols can be useful, not only
in describing and organizing protocols that already exist, but generating new protocols
that satisfy different types of requirements. We expect this to be the case here as well.
We do not intend to limit ourselves to proximity and social authentication. We ex-
pect this approach to work for other types of channels as well. In particular, we intend to
investigate applications of our approach to quantum cryptography. Any quantum pro-
tocol, in order to be practical, will need to be harnessed together with conventional
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protocols as well. Although there as been a substantial amount of work on formal meth-
ods for quantum computation and quantum cryptography, very little of it addresses this
aspect of the problem. We expect our methods to provide a natural way of doing this.
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